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Abstract 
Unintended damage to non-military targets is typically straightforward to characterize and weigh against anticipated benefits 
because of well-established definitions, technical assessments, and legal conventions. In a kinetic military context, collateral 
damage occurs when a hostile action causes physical or property damage to a civilian target. However, collateral effects caused 
by cyber operations lack formal recognition when they are limited to electronic data, information technology and computing 
systems, whether caused by conventional military operations, or the result of law enforcement, or private sector operations. Even 
though there may be tangible consequences stemming from the loss or destruction of data, conventional norms are ill equipped to 
formally recognize them.  Uniquely in the cybersecurity context, tactical operations may have broad systemic “collateral” effects 
on other important policy priorities that must be accounted for. In short, we lack a clear conceptual vocabulary for cyber 
operations for both the military operations, as well as for non-military operations, where many cyber activities occur. This 
research examines this discontinuity by first examining conventional military definitions of “cyber operations,” “collateral 
damage” and international norms governing operations conducted by lawful participants against military targets. It then examines 
a number of important similarities and differences between conventional and cyber operations as they relate to damage and 
injury. Finally, it introduces other contexts for considering collateral damage in the cyber realm, and the way in which other legal 
and strategic regimes have handled the concept, providing specific examples of these outcomes and guidance for how to think 
about collateral damage in a range of contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
In conventional (kinetic) warfare, there exists a standard methodology for identifying and assessing collateral 
damage (i.e. accidental damage to civilian targets). Indeed, there is a formal policy regarding hostile actions taken 
toward unlawful military targets (no-strike targets), and methods for estimating collateral damage from kinetic 
military operations. The definitions are clear and the harms described are tangible because they relate to persons and 
property (JP 3-60). The impacts of a kinetic operation (collateral or otherwise), therefore, can be straightforward to 
anticipate, assess, and manage.  
However, given the interconnectedness of cyber and cyber-physical systems, direct, indirect, and collateral effects 
can be much more difficult to predict, rendering ineffective traditional approaches to collateral damage estimation 
(CDE). Indeed, even the notion of clearly defining and considering “damage” within the cyber realm is challenging. 
For example, how does one estimate any harms resulting from an outage of network connectivity caused when an 
attacker exploits a software vulnerability of a civilian supplier in order to affect an adversary’s computing system? 
How can one evaluate and weigh the collateral impact of a cyber intervention on incommensurable values, such as 
unmasking the IP addresses of Tor users in order to arrest child pornographers, against international comity concerns 
that might be implicated by remotely searching foreign computers in contravention of traditional diplomatic and law 
enforcement norms? 
We consider two main questions within this Article. First, how does traditional military doctrine consider and 
incorporate collateral damage resulting from cyber operations? And second, what are conventional notions of effects 
caused by cyber operations that should reasonably be considered as collateral damage?  
The purpose of this Article is not to reproduce existing literature regarding cyber war, military doctrine, or 
international laws of war, but rather to draw on these (and other) resources in order to compare notions of traditional 
(kinetic) military operations with those conducted in cyberspace, from the perspective of collateral damage. The 
ultimate impact will be felt in two spheres. First, in a world in which military and civilian use the same cyber 
infrastructure, the conceptual framework outlined here will help design interventions that can be more militarily 
effective without jeopardizing civilian infrastructure. And second, can help develop a roadmap for better 
understanding the second and third-order effects of cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure. Note that we do not 
address the ways by which cyber capabilities are used to achieve the same goals as kinetic operations; rather we seek 
to understand how damage, and therefore collateral damage, may occur from cyber operations in a range of contexts.  
In so doing, we aim to identify areas for future research, focused on understanding with greater confidence and 
precision the unintended consequences of cyber operations. 
2. Definitions 
Before we begin the analysis, we first consider the following definitions in order to obtain a common 
understanding of their use throughout this manuscript.  
2.1. “Cyber” operations 
While formal definitions of “cyber” and “cyber operations” are evolving, for the purpose of this Article, we 
consider cyber operations to include the “(1) use [of] cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, or 
networks: and (2) have a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.” (DoD, 2015). 
More clearly, cyber operations often include three main types of activities: computer network defense (CND), 
computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE) (TRADOC, 2010, p19). In this context, 
CND refers to actions taken “to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity”* within a 
computer network. CNA refers to actions taken “through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
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destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves,”† and 
CNE refers to “enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer 
networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.” That is, CND refers 
to protecting a network, CNA refers to attacking a network, and CNE refers to surveilling a network. 
2.2. “Collateral” damage 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines collateral damage as the “unintentional or incidental injury or 
damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time” (JP 3-
60, D-5, emphasis added). Similarly, the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard 
University (HPRC, 2009, p3) defines collateral damage as “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects or other protected objects or a combination thereof, caused by an attack on a lawful 
target” (HPRC, 2009). Essentially, these definitions amount to accidental harm to non-military targets, and they are 
narrow in their description of both harm (considering only physical or property), and the object of any potential 
harm (non-military targets only). For example, consider a bomb that destroys a military factory but also damages a 
command center and school, only damage to the school would be considered collateral damage. Ancillary damage to 
the command center is simply a side effect that is favorable to the attacker. 
These definitions also suggest that accidental harm suffered by friendly forces (or to the attacker themselves) 
would not be considered collateral damage. Other outcomes not specifically defined include harm suffered by the 
attacker as a result of any retaliation in any form such as diplomatic, informational, military, or economic 
(sometimes referred to as “DIME”).  
Note that in the case of an intentional attack on civilian facilities or people, the attack and any subsequent harms 
would not be considered collateral damage, but would instead constitute a violation of the laws of war (DoD, 2015). 
2.3. Damage and harm 
A formal definition of harm (damage) is necessary for a discussion of cyber collateral damage for the specific 
reason that absent any harm, there would be no collateral damage to evaluate (cyber, or otherwise). Attacks using 
conventional weapons enjoy the benefit that the damage caused by invoking such weapons is often straightforward 
(though perhaps not easy) to estimate. Indeed, military doctrine provides a process for estimating the physical 
damage caused to property due to a kinetic weapon. Moreover, the understanding of damage is unambiguous. 
Conversely with cyber operations, however, the outcomes can be much more uncertain and evidence of whether 
damage has occurred at all may be unavailable. This is precisely because cyber and cyber-physical systems are 
complex and interdependent. For this reason, it is difficult to estimate the second and third-order effects of cyber 
attacks on related systems, and in particular on civilian systems. It is thus difficult to evaluate the anticipated 
collateral damage, and thus the legality and effectiveness, of cyber operations. 
Indeed, a critical observation, and one main purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the ways in which evolving 
notions of harm in the cyber domain do not have a comfortable place in the traditional context of collateral damage. 
For instance, consider a software vulnerability exploited by an adversary. The vulnerability is used to install a 
software program that causes the adversary’s power station to overload and be physically destroyed. In this case, the 
method of committing the attack (i.e. using computer software to destroy the power station) is irrelevant for the 
discussion of damage assessment. Whether caused by a conventional bomb, or cyber attack, the physical effects 
from this example are similar, as would be the assessment of any collateral damage. For the purpose of this Article, 
it is the consequence of an operation that matters, not the means by which it occurs. 
However, consider the same vulnerability that is exploited, but instead of overloading a power plant’s operations, 
malware is placed on a computer which could -- but has not yet -- affected the power operation. Has any harm 
occurred? If so, what? One can imagine many other possible scenarios, such as malware that is installed simply to 
 
 
† See http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/10082.html. 
13 Sasha Romanosky and Zachary Goldman /  Procedia Computer Science  95 ( 2016 )  10 – 17 
observe network traffic on an adversary’s computer network. What harm or damage has been caused by this form of 
surveillance (e.g. CNE)? Or even more directly, consider that same software deletes a corporate or State database. 
Again, has any “damage” actually occurred? The answers to these questions lie at the intersection of US legal 
doctrine and the law of armed conflict, both of which are struggling to keep pace with technology and the 
capabilities afforded by information technology.  
3. How do operations cause (collateral) damage? 
Next, we draw on multiple sources of US legal and military doctrines, as well as other academic work, to consider 
the conditions that would apply in order to determine whether an offensive operation could cause collateral damage. 
We then leverage this analysis to consider when a cyber operation could produce collateral damage. Most 
substantively, we draw on the work of the Tallinn Manual (2013), a document that reflects the combined effort of 
dozens of international legal scholars and former practitioners since 2009 to consider (not define) how existing 
international military laws (i.e. Laws of Armed Conflict) would apply to offensive cyber operations.‡  
For the purpose of establishing a baseline understanding, we first consider that an operation must be executed 
under the guidance and authority of the US system of laws.§ That operation will then include three components: 
identifying a lawful target, invoking a lawful participant (the individual who carries out the operation), and 
differentiating between a hostile military activity and intelligence collection. The components and their relationships 
are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Collateral Damage Relationship diagram 
 
Authority: The first step concerns the rules of US law that grant authority to, and requires oversight for, state 
agents to perform (international) operations. For our purpose, there are two key provisions. First, Title 10 governs 
the functions and responsibilities of the US armed forces, which grants authority for traditional military operations, 
including CNA operation (U.S.C Title 10). Oversight for these operations is provided by armed services committees 
and internal executive branch processes. Second, Title 50 governs some US conduct during times of war and peace, 
and matters of national security and grants authority for intelligence activities, including CNE (espionage) 
operations (U.S.C Title 50). Oversight for certain of these operations is conducted by Congress and the executive 
branch and may require formal presidential findings. Note that in recent years, the distinction has blurred between 
operations performed under these Titles, complicating the authorities and oversight under which they are granted.**  
 
 
 
‡ Note that the focus of the Tallinn Manual was necessarily internationally focused given that this is the area in which military 
and intelligence operations operate. However, this does not distract from the purpose of this exercise. 
§ This distinction is critical because the particular authority by which an operation is conducted incorporates many critical factors 
beyond the scope of this Article. Not the least of which concerns any wartime protections that the individual would enjoy if 
caught by an adversary. 
** E.g. See Wall (2011) concerning the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden.  
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Test of lawful target: Next we consider the lawfulness of an operation, which is mainly concerned with whether 
or not the target is engaging or assisting in military operations (in a material way), versus acting in a civilian 
capacity. For example, a command and control center that directs military assets is considered a lawful target, or an 
airport used to store and launch military aircraft. On the other hand, diplomatic, religious, or humanitarian people or 
objects (buildings) would clearly be considered civilian, and therefore, unlawful targets. (Note that there are many 
exceptions and areas of ambiguity, and so see Tallinn (2013) rules 25, 30.8, 30.17, 31.5, 31.6, 32.4, 34, 35, 37.6, and 
36 for more information. (For example, if a civilian airport was also used to store military aircraft, it could be 
considered a lawful target.) Therefore, a target is generally considered lawful if it is a military target.††  The ways in 
which civilian and military infrastructure overlap poses particular challenges for evaluating collateral damage with 
respect to cyber operations. 
Test of lawful participant: Next we consider the tests necessary to determine whether an individual who 
engages in an operation (cyber or otherwise) is acting lawfully under the laws of armed conflict. The main condition 
is whether or not the individual is a formal military personnel. The Geneva Conventions (Geneva, 1949) define two 
broad categories of wartime participants, combatants and non-combatants (i.e. civilians). This classification of status 
becomes critical insofar as it addresses three principal entitlements: lawful participation in hostile actions, enemy 
targeting, and protections afforded if captured. In regard to participation in hostile activities, military forces are 
permitted to engage in hostilities against lawful military targets. Therefore, an individual is considered to be 
lawfully participating in hostile actions if she is a military combatant, and not a civilian.  
A related consideration in cyber operations is the likelihood of civilian involvement in hostilities (and 
specifically, the targeting process of a hostile action), which may be more common with CNE/CNA operations 
simply because of the ubiquitous nature of computers and computer training by the population, and the broader 
circumstances in which we need to evaluate collateral damage in the cybersecurity context. This poses a stark 
contrast to traditional understandings of collateral damage, which generally arise only in the military context. 
Test of an attack: Next, we examine when an operation may be considered an “attack.” The two matters of key 
interest are regarding the attacker’s behavior and the consequence of attack (Tallinn (2013), rule 30.7). Note that for 
the purpose of this test, the method of attack is not relevant. Article 49 of the Geneva Conventions (Geneva, 1949) 
defines an attack as an “[act] of violence against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense” (Protocol 1, 1977) 
and is considered accepted international law. This alone suggests that an operation would be considered an “attack” 
conditional on it inflicting harm.‡‡  
Test of harm: By all accounts of military actions, the single test for whether harm has occurred is whether an 
operation causes injury or death to persons, or damage or destruction to objects (see Tallinn, 2013, rules 10, 12, 
30.1, 30.4, 30.6, 35.4, 38.5, 38.6). And therefore, harm would not include: inconvenience, irritation, stress, or fear, 
because they do not amount to “loss of life,” “injury,” or “damage” (Tallinn, 2012, p133). For example, disabling 
civilian internet access may be considered a nuisance, but would not rise to the level of harm. In this regard, there is 
a threshold of inconvenience versus form damage, torture or terror.  The question in the context of cyber operations 
is whether militaries are able to estimate the potential damage from a cyber attack with sufficient confidence to 
predict potential harm to protected persons. 
This final test is critical in our analysis of when an operation, cyber or otherwise, would constitute an attack, and 
of more relevance to our discussion, when an operation could result in collateral damage. That is, based on the 
analysis provided (i.e., under conventional international norms and understanding), collateral damage would occur 
only when “damage” has itself occurred, which in turn, can only result from an “attack” (i.e. a hostile action). And 
therefore only when accidental damage to civilian property or persons has occurred, can collateral damage result. 
This observation is startling, because it implies only a very narrow set of conditions which could possibly lead to a 
formally recognized notion of collateral damage resulting from a cyber operation. However, this finding is 
understandably unsatisfying given a reasonable person’s impression of affects and consequences in a digital world. 
 
 
†††† The target must also satisfy the Rule of Proportionality, which weighs the military benefit enjoyed against the harm or 
suffering that it would cause (DoD, 2015, p60).  
‡‡ For a list of exceptions, see Tallinn (2013), rules 30.2, 30.14-15, 30.18, 32.5, 36. 
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Indeed, one could well imagine that there are many circumstances where actions taken by one party (military or 
otherwise) could result in what many would consider “collateral” or “unintended” effects to another party who is not 
directly engaged in the dynamic between two entities.  This is particularly so if it is difficult to estimate second and 
third-order effects of interventions in complex dependent systems. 
 Therefore, in the next section, we explore and expand upon what may more reasonably be considered to be 
included within the scope of cyber collateral damage, and which other bodies of law and policy have already begun 
to recognize as such.  Ultimately, military considerations of collateral damage must import some of the lessons 
derived from these other contexts. 
4. Modern notions of cyber collateral damage 
Discussions concerning cyber collateral damage (i.e. unintentional effects caused by computer-related activities) 
often extend beyond the military context to include corporate, law enforcement, and even private citizen activities. 
Indeed, it is this disconnect between military and non-military contexts that we highlight in this section, where the 
consequences often focus on two perspectives: impacts to information and information technology systems, and 
impacts to critical policy priorities. Indeed, the latter concern—namely, the collateral impact that cyber operations 
might have on strategic-level policy concerns, may be unique to cybersecurity. For it is rare that policymakers 
harbor worries that particular tactical interventions may derail entire policy initiatives that are not directly linked to 
the tactical operation.  
4.1. Impacts to information systems 
Collateral damage (though perhaps not always known by this term) has been recognized with respect to several 
types of cyber operations, many of which are associated with law enforcement operations. For example, in one case 
a Federal District Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required ISPs to block child pornography when 
served with a court order requiring them to do so. The statute in question enabled law enforcement to obtain a court 
order conditional on them demonstrating probable cause that a particular digital file contained child pornography. 
However, Internet service providers maintained that no matter which blocking technique they used (DNS filtering, 
IP filtering, or URL filtering) the blocking resulted in an excessive impact on uninvolved and legitimate web traffic. 
Because the “burden on protected expression [was] substantial whereas there is no evidence that the Act has 
impacted child sexual abuse” the court struck down the statute on First Amendment grounds.§§  
In addition, certain efforts to disable computer botnets have been criticized because of the excessive collateral 
damage. The takedown of the “No-IP” botnet resulted in significant impact when a considerable amount of 
legitimate, in addition to malicious, web traffic became unavailable (Krebs, 2014). To the extent that botnets are 
disrupted or, indeed, commandeered by government actors, takedowns that result in such collateral effects could 
result in Fourth Amendment claims that domain names were seized in an unreasonable manner. 
Another example to be considered is in 2008, when a cyber operation dismantled a web forum (that was being 
hosted on a server in Iraq) that was used by al-Qaida Iraq to plan operations against American troops. However, this 
operation also impacted the Internet connectivity and IT systems of computers located in Saudi Arabia, Germany, 
and Texas (Nakashima, 2010). 
A final example is the Stuxnet attack, which exploited a number of software vulnerabilities in order to overload 
and damage Iranian nuclear reactors. In this case, it evinced an awareness of the risks of collateral damage when its 
engineers reportedly took deliberate steps to limit its propagation and to surgically isolate its targets (Lindsay, 
2013). Richard Clarke, the cybersecurity coordinator during the Bush administration, considered these steps as a 
deliberate attempt to reduce any effects to proximate IT systems (Lindsay, 2013). In addition to physical damage 
caused by the cyber operation, one may well consider that collateral effects would extend well beyond Iranian 
nuclear facilities. If the full attack were to be reverse engineered, it could well expose each of the software 
vulnerabilities exploited, enabling the attack to be repurposed against facilities in other countries, at any time. 
 
 
§§ Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
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Indeed, one may consider that some portion of the attack could even be reconfigured and used against its original 
creator. In this case, the conventional notions of “collateral damage” become quite murky, but no less important. 
4.2. Impacts to policy priorities 
In addition to the aforementioned cyber operations that cause collateral effects, they may also affect much 
broader policy initiatives. Cyber operations may raise these worries uniquely because cyber and cyber-physical 
systems are interdependent in unanticipated ways, and because the “bad guys” and the “good guys” all use the same 
electronic devices, software, operating systems, networks, and cloud service providers. Other unique properties of 
cyberspace, such as the difficulty of attribution (Rid et al, 2015), also contribute to the potential for specific 
interventions to have broader collateral effects. Thus, tactical interventions with respect to particular systems might 
have significantly broader impact than we generally expect with respect to kinetic military operations, which affect 
only those within some measure of physical distance from the target. Examples of areas where specific cyber 
activities may broadly affect other policy priorities are provided below.  
Hacking Back: Debates concerning an entity’s offensive response to an attack by an adversary (aka “hacking 
back”) are fraught with uncertainty insofar as they may affect a State’s international relations and policy priorities – 
such as the ability to control escalation during a conflict. Separate and apart from the legal issues, offensive cyber 
activities (whether in response to an attack or not) by U.S. corporations or individuals would violate the US 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and widespread use of this technique could have unpredictable effects and embroil 
the U.S. in a broader set of international conflicts (Kuchler, 2015). 
Searches for Data Stored Extraterritorially: The United States is currently involved in litigation against 
Microsoft that will determine whether a search warrant issued in the United States is sufficient to compel the 
company to hand over emails of a customer stored on a server in Ireland.*** Commentary about the case (and 
Microsoft’s legal arguments) have revolved around the collateral impact that such a ruling might have on cloud 
storage (Daskal, 2015; Woods, 2015),††† in addition to the more specific legal arguments about the reach of the 
statute at issue. In this case, the collateral damage to be considered is the long-term political and economic 
ramifications of legal precedent.  
Compelling Third Parties to Decrypt Data upon Service of Legal Process: Finally, controversies are raging 
about the circumstances under which companies like Apple can be compelled to bypass their own 
encryption/security systems in order to effectuate a lawful process such as a search warrant or other form of court or 
administrative order (Apple, 2016).While there has been significant debate about the statutory question (whether the 
All Writs Act can be used to compel compliance in situations like this) a significant amount of discussion—
including by Tim Cook, CEO of Apple—has focused on the collateral impact of a ruling in the U.S. government’s 
favor on the security of Apple products broadly used throughout the world (Ackerman, 2016).   
These examples (tactical operations that cause a direct impact to IT systems, and strategic operations that affect 
policy efforts), demonstrate that a holistic understanding of collateral damage in the cyber context will need to adopt 
new understandings of “harm” and must move beyond an exclusive focus on military operations. 
5. Conclusion 
This Article has shown how collateral damage, as understood in the conventional military context, is very narrowly 
defined in that collateral damage may only arise from a violent hostile action that causes physical or property 
damage to a civilian target. This suggests that typical cyber operation, such as cyber espionage, denial of service, or 
disruption of critical infrastructure, would fall short of causing damage (collateral or otherwise), and therefore never 
be considered an attack.  Intuitively, however, we recognize that unintended effects caused by cyber activities are 
have the potential for causing effects that are much broader than traditional military doctrine would describe. This 
 
 
*** See, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) for the District Court opinion upholding the Department of Justice’s search warrant application.  
††† See, e.g., Recent Case, In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1019 (2015). 
17 Sasha Romanosky and Zachary Goldman /  Procedia Computer Science  95 ( 2016 )  10 – 17 
Article has begun to lay the conceptual groundwork for a richer understanding of this critical disconnect- one that 
reflects the pervasiveness of cyber and cyber-physical systems in our digital world. 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Lily Ablon, Charles Brown, Bob Elder, Martin Libicki, Eric Jensen, Cynthia Dion-
Schwarz, Mark Sparkman, David Senty, and Sean Watts for their valuable comments and insights. 
References 
1. Breaking Down Apple’s iPhone Fight With the U.S. Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2016, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/03/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-fight-explained.html?_r=1 
2. Spencer Ackerman, Apple encryption case risks influencing Russia and China, privacy experts say, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 17, 
2016 
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60; Joint Targeting, 2013. 
4. Jennifer Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015); 
5. Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, 2015. 
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
7. Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2013), p. 387 
8. Brian Krebs, Microsoft Darkens 4MM Sites in Malware Fight, Krebs on Security (Jul. 14, 2014) available at 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/07/microsoft-darkens-4mm-sites-in-malware-fight/comment-page-1/. 
9. Hannah Kuchler, Cyber insecurity:  Hacking back, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2015 
10. Ellen Nakashima, Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web site illustrates need for clearer cyberwar policies, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 
2010. 
11. Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, J. STRATEGIC STUDIES, Vol. 38 Nos. 1-2 (2015). 
12. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University (HPCR), Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Harvard University, 2009. 
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
14. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the 
Invitation of The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
15. United Stated Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010. 
16. Wall, Andru, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & 
Covert Action, Harvard Law School National Security Journal, 2011, 1(3):85-142.  
17. Andrew K. Woods, Global network initiative, data beyond borders mutual legal assistance in the internet age (2015), 
available at https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20MLAT%20Report.pdf. 
